Revolution’s aftermath: population based cross-sectional study to understand the intergeneration mental health and wellbeing following the 2024 student-led uprising
Comparative efficacy of non-pharmacological therapies in adolescents with subthreshold depression: a systematic review and network meta-analysis
RESCUE- expected usefulness and willingness to participate in a trauma-informed group intervention for coping with traumatic work experiences in the emergency medical services
Effects of Patient Portal Message Framing on Treatment Preferences and Expectations for Degenerative Meniscus Tears: Randomized Exploratory Cross-Sectional Survey Study
STAT+: Capsida says it still doesn’t know what caused gene therapy death
Capsida Biotherapeutics said Tuesday that it still had no answers in its investigation into the death of a child in a gene therapy trial last September.
Its scientists’ efforts, it said, have been stymied because the hospital where the study was conducted has declined to share tissue samples from an autopsy.
The therapy, known as CAP-002, was the first of a wave of new gene therapies designed to deliver genes deep into the brain. Scientists around the world engineered viruses that could slide through the blood-brain barrier that walls off our most vital organ from the rest of the body. Companies spun up promising treatments for devastating rare genetic diseases and common conditions like Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s.
Smart Pediatric Oncology Tracker of Symptoms (SPOTS), a Web-Based Interface for the Pediatric PRO-CTCAE: Development and Usability Study
Researchers develop innovative model for risk assessment for hypertrophic cardiomyopathy
A global matching model of choice and response times in the Deese–Roediger–Mcdermott semantic and structural false recognition paradigms.
Psychological Review, Vol 133(4), Jul 2026, 771-819; doi:10.1037/rev0000596
One of the most common method of eliciting false memories in the laboratory is the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995), where participants study a set of items that are all similar to a nonpresented critical lure. A common finding is that false recognition to critical lures is much higher than to other nonpresented items and in some cases is even comparable to true recognition, regardless of whether similarity is semantic or structural (e.g., phonological or orthographic) relations. While there exists a handful of computational models of this paradigm, they have only been applied to semantic but not structural false recognition, they have not been fit at the level of individual participants, and they have not been applied to response times. We present a global matching model that addresses all three of these current gaps. Global similarity of semantic and structural representations drives a pair of linear ballistic accumulators, which are used to produce decisions as well as complete response time distributions. In addition to being able to account for heightened false recognition of critical lures, the model was able to account for differences across both individual participants and items, lower correlations between semantic and structural false recognition than true recognition, differences in false recognition across levels of processing, improved true recognition but not false recognition with higher study time, and heightened false recognition under speed emphasis. The model suggests that semantic and structural false recognition can be explained using only a single retrieval mechanism. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved)
Control adjustment costs limit goal flexibility: Empirical evidence and a computational account.
Psychological Review, Vol 133(4), Jul 2026, 846-863; doi:10.1037/rev0000576
A cornerstone of human intelligence is the ability to flexibly adjust our cognition and behavior as our goals change. For instance, achieving some goals requires efficiency, while others require caution. Different goals require us to engage different control processes, such as adjusting how attentive and cautious we are. Here, we show that performance incurs control adjustment costs when people adjust control to meet changing goals. Across four experiments, we provide evidence of these costs and validate a dynamical systems model explaining the source of these costs. Participants performed a single cognitively demanding task under varying performance goals (e.g., being fast or accurate). We modeled control allocation to include a dynamic process of adjusting from one’s current control state to a target state for a given performance goal. By incorporating inertia into this adjustment process, our model accounts for our empirical finding that people undershoot their target control state more (i.e., exhibit larger adjustment costs) when goals switch rather than remain fixed (Study 1). Further validating our model, we show that the magnitude of this cost is increased when: distances between target states are larger (Study 2), there is less time to adjust to the new goal (Study 3), and goal switches are more frequent (Study 4). Our findings characterize the costs of adjusting control to meet changing goals and show that these costs emerge directly from cognitive control dynamics. In so doing, they shed new light on the sources of and constraints on flexibility of goal-directed behavior. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved)

