BFRBs vs. OCD: Similarities and Differences

This blog was originally posted by the TLC Foundation for BFRBs

Body-focused repetitive behaviors (BFRBs) and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) are two distinct mental health conditions that share some similarities but also have significant differences. BFRBs involve repetitive, self-grooming behaviors that can cause physical damage, such as hair pulling or skin picking. On the other hand, OCD is a condition characterized by intrusive thoughts (obsessions) and repetitive behaviors (compulsions) performed to alleviate anxiety. 

While both conditions involve repetitive behaviors and can impact daily life, their underlying mechanisms, triggers, and treatment approaches differ. This article explores the key similarities and differences between BFRBs and OCD to better understand these complex conditions.

Similarities Between BFRBs and OCD

Most professionals view BFRBs and OCD as similar conditions due to the similarity in symptoms, such as compulsivity and repetitive behaviors. These two conditions share several similar systems and are usually a reaction to triggering factors such as stress and anxiety. Below are some of their similarities.

Repetitive Behaviors

Individuals dealing with BFRBs often engage in various repetitive behaviors such as hair pulling, lip biting, or skin picking. These actions are usually challenging to control and are frequently triggered by stress or anxiety. One may indulge in the habit subconsciously to find instant relief from the trigger. 

Individuals with OCD often experience intrusive thoughts that result in repetitive behaviors known as compulsions. Some common compulsions include washing hands and repetitively checking or counting to alleviate the stress caused by obsessive thoughts. In both conditions, the repetitive behaviors are often exacerbated by stress and anxiety, and individuals may adapt these behaviors as a coping mechanism.

Impulse Control

Closely related to repetitive behaviors is the concept of impulse control. Both BFRBs and OCD involve challenges in this area, albeit in different ways. Individuals with BFRBs and OCD may find it hard to control the urge to perform repetitive behaviors. This is because these repetitive behaviors often relieve tension. Despite knowing the consequences of these behaviors, the desire to indulge in them is usually irresistible. 

For example, individuals with BFRBs understand that hair pulling may affect their appearance, but they cannot refrain from doing it. OCD occurs as a result of intrusive thoughts whereby one believes that if they do not perform a specific action, the stressor won’t go away. These intrusive thoughts often cause anxiety, which can be eased by engaging in the said repetitive behavior.

Onset and Course

Having examined the behavioral aspects, let’s now consider how these conditions develop over time. The onset of these two conditions shares several similarities regarding age, triggers, and psychological mechanisms. 

The onset of both conditions is usually during childhood or adolescence and often coincides with various developmental changes and stressors. For individuals with BFRBs, the repetitive behaviors alleviate stress and anxiety instantly. At the same time, for those with OCD, performing the compulsions temporarily relieves them from the stress caused by their intrusive thoughts. The cognitive patterns involve repetitive actions, intrusive thoughts, and a lack of impulse control. In BFRBs, the urge to engage in these repetitive behaviors can be intrusive and persistent, while in OCD, one’s obsessions create a sense of urgency, which leads to the adoption of compulsive actions.

Neurobiological Factors

To fully understand the similarities between BFRBs and OCD, we must delve deeper into their biological underpinnings. Both conditions have a genetic origin and are associated with neurobiological factors. Neurobiological studies indicate that the impulse control and emotional regulation difficulties for people with BFRBs and OCD are often caused by abnormalities in brain regions that are responsible for impulse control and habit formation. Therefore, the underlying brain mechanism may result in the onset and development of both conditions. It is not uncommon for individuals to have both BFRBs and OCD or for both conditions to coincide with other mental health conditions, usually depression and anxiety. The overlap is generally because they typically share common underlying factors that play a part in their severity and development.

Differences Between OCD and BFRBs

While BFRBs and OCD share several commonalities, it’s equally important to understand their distinct characteristics, from the symptoms to the underlying mechanisms. Let’s explore the key differences that distinguish these two conditions.

Nature of the Behavior

First and foremost, let’s examine how the behaviors associated with each condition differ in their fundamental nature. Individuals dealing with these two conditions adopt diverse behaviors as coping mechanisms for their triggers. In BFRBs, the behaviors adopted, such as trichotillomania (hair-pulling) or cheek-biting, usually result in physical harm. However, regardless of the consequences, one always feels relieved when picking their skin or pulling their hair. 

OCD, on the other hand, involves a wide range of compulsions, from washing to organizing, checking, and counting. Compulsive behaviors are performed due to intrusive thoughts that make one think that if they fail to indulge in a specific behavior, they might get hurt, or there might be other negative consequences.

Presence of Obsessions

Another crucial distinction lies in the cognitive processes behind these behaviors. Generally, BFRBs do not involve obsessive thoughts. The primary focus on BFRBs is usually more on the physical behavior and not the fear of specific consequences. 

However, the major characteristic of OCD is intrusive thoughts, which increase the urge to indulge in particular behaviors for relief. The thoughts are usually persistent with unwanted images that result in distress. 

People with BFRBs DO NOT report that if they do not pick on their skin, something terrible will happen. Instead, they report that picking or pulling their hair helps relieve them from intense and negative emotions. These behaviors, therefore, serve a self-regulatory function, unlike in OCD, where the repetitive behavior calms them from their intrusive thoughts.

Triggers

The nature of triggers for each condition is closely related to the presence or absence of obsessions. The primary trigger in BFRBs is stress and anxiety, but for OCD, the main trigger is intrusive thoughts, which then result in anxiety. OCD and BFRBs triggers differ in several ways, often resulting in different outcomes. OCD triggers often result in one taking measures to prevent harm, while for BFRBs, one uses the adopted behaviors to regulate and manage intense emotions. The nature of thoughts is an essential distinguishing factor, seeing as OCD involves intrusive and obsessive thoughts that trigger specific behaviors adopted to prevent harm. The purpose of compulsions in OCD is to reduce the anxiety caused by the obsessive thoughts, while in BFRBs, the behaviors are for emotional relief.

Awareness

Beyond triggers, the level of conscious awareness also differentiates these two conditions. Those dealing with BFRBs usually find themselves biting their nails or even pulling their hair subconsciously. Individuals with OCD are generally aware of their intrusive thoughts and are compelled to adopt specific behaviors as a response to these thoughts. Individuals with OCD are often aware of their compulsions and understand when they are being irrational, but they are unable to control themselves. Compared to people with OCD, those with BFRBs often find their behaviors more rewarding than distressing.

Treatment

Finally, while both conditions may benefit from cognitive behavioral therapy, the specific approach to treatment varies significantly. For individuals with BFRBs, the focus is on behavior modification and awareness, achieved through habit reversal training. For OCD, the emphasis is often placed on exposure to anxiety-provoking thoughts to help an individual tolerate anxiety, which prevents compulsive behavior.

Bottom Line 

While BFRBs and OCD can coexist, they are distinct disorders with unique manifestations despite sharing some similarities. The key distinctions between these conditions are evident in their underlying mechanisms and treatment approaches.

Both involve compulsive behaviors, but their purposes differ. BFRBs primarily serve as subconscious tools for emotional regulation. OCD compulsions are conscious attempts to alleviate anxiety and prevent perceived harmful consequences. BFRB behaviors often occur with limited conscious awareness, while OCD sufferers are typically more aware of their compulsive actions.

Both conditions can significantly affect daily functioning and social interactions.BFRBs may lead to physical injuries and lowered self-esteem due to visible effects. OCD can cause severe anxiety and time-consuming rituals that interfere with daily activities.BFRB treatment emphasizes behavior modification and awareness techniques, while OCD treatment often involves exposure therapy to reduce anxiety responses.

Understanding these distinctions is crucial for accurate diagnosis and effective treatment. While both conditions present challenges, with proper support and intervention, individuals with BFRBs or OCD can learn to manage their symptoms and improve their overall quality of life.

The post BFRBs vs. OCD: Similarities and Differences appeared first on International OCD Foundation.

<![CDATA[FDA accepts AXS-12 NDA for cataplexy in narcolepsy after phase 3 shows fewer attacks, better wakefulness, and cognition; decision due May 2027.]]>

Amit Etkin: Precision Psychiatry’s Future Isn’t Genomics—It’s Brain Activity

For decades, psychiatry has used trial-and-error symptom-based diagnoses and treatments. Standardized diagnostic frameworks brought much-needed consistency to the field, but they also grouped diverse patients with different biology. Consequently, many people receive unsuitable treatments.

On this episode of Behind the Breakthroughs, Alto Neuroscience founder and CEO Amit Etkin, MD, PhD, discusses how precision medicine will change mental health care. Etkin explains how objective biological measures like cognitive testing, EEG brain activity, sleep and circadian rhythm monitoring, and advanced computational analysis can help identify patients who will benefit from specific therapies rather than just symptoms. Comparing psychiatry to precision oncology, he explains why it is at a turning point. Instead of finding a perfect biomarker, the field is developing practical, scalable tools to link brain function to targeted drug development.

Etkin shows from Alto’s clinical pipeline how matching therapies to biologically defined patient populations can improve outcomes and reduce psychiatric treatment uncertainty. We also examine the potential and limitations of genetics, multi-omics, wearables, and AI in precision psychiatry. Etkin explains why brain measurements may be more clinically useful than peripheral biomarkers and how AI can help find patterns in complex biological data. Finally, we discuss how precision psychiatry will become routine clinical practice, from regulatory acceptance and standardized data collection to the first biomarker-guided therapies. If successful, these advances could transform psychiatric disorder diagnosis, treatment, and understanding.

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

 

IPM: What has been the key limiting factor to advancing precision psychiatry?

Etkin: There was a period of time in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s when psychiatry was beginning to develop. Our definition of diseases was bespoke to how you practiced them. They really made very little sense.

Amit Etkin - Alto Neuroscience
Amit Etkin, MD, PhD, co-founder and CEO of Alto Neuroscience [Alto Neuroscience]

The DSM did a great job of bringing everybody under the same diagnostic umbrella. We can talk about a common set of symptoms and everybody’s talking about them. Yes, we have wonky definitions of diseases, but at least we’re starting to use the same definition.

We are finding large, heterogeneous groups of people that fit into a category. If you examine the words used to describe some psychiatric labels from the past, they sound antiquated because they are linked to outdated concepts and are inconsistently defined. That was good. The problem is that we never transitioned beyond that.

I try to focus on a much simpler approach to what we’re doing. Instead of thinking about biomarkers, machine learning, and so forth, it’s about knowing what we are doing. If what you’re doing is developing a drug for a population with depression, it’s a massive category where some people just symptomatically might sleep more and others sleep less, and some eat more and others eat less. There seems like it’s a bit of a mess. What would you want to know? At a very basic level, that would simply allow you to know what you’re doing better. What would you like to measure?

There are any number of answers. We know that some patients with depression have cognitive problems and others don’t and that people with cognitive problems have worse outcomes regarding standards of care and treatment. We’ve known that for a long time. But why aren’t we doing that measurement systematically in every single drug trial or in clinical care? Because if we did that one little thing systematically, we would see that some treatments or people saw it one way and others saw it another way just by collecting that data more systematically. That’s what we had been doing in the lab: figuring out what kind of data to collect systematically.

That’s what led us to the form Alto, understanding that there are certain measures, like cognition and brain activity. We do this non-invasively with electroencephalogram (EEG) brainwave recordings and wearables to look at circadian rhythms that are physiologically and biologically meaningful, easily scalable, low cost to meet our health system’s needs, and, if done consistently, insightful for separating populations and identifying mechanisms to develop for them and for translating back to an animal model, which is not possible if you only look at depressive symptoms.

Do we know what we’re doing now? No. We’re really just beginning on this journey as a field. But I do think people now recognize that this is the direction of travel. You can see that more and more companies and academic research centers are emerging under this theme.

 

IPM: What are your thoughts on the use of genomics, multi-omics, or blood-based biomarkers of the central nervous system?

Etkin: The way I interpret that literature is that there’s smoke but not yet fire. The classical molecular marker is genetics. We get that on every patient, but we do not use stratification here, as genetics cannot achieve meaningful stratification in our populations. It’s predominantly common variance with each of them, or in combination, having a very rare large effect size variance, which is really not going to be clinically meaningful from a drug perspective because you’re treating one out of every 10,000 people or whatever the prevalence is.

I don’t know the best polygenic risk score for schizophrenia, determined from 100,000 people, which is probably the high watermark for psychiatric genetics and may explain 1–2% of the variance. You needed to explain at least 10% to stratify the population even a little bit. I don’t think genetics will ever get us there for that purpose.

Where there’s smoke but not yet fire are immune measures. There have been many implications for different immune measures in psychiatric disorders, but every time it gets tested to see whether people with high inflammation respond to something that targets our process directly or indirectly, those studies never really work out.

Then there’s the even larger world of multi-omics, where you have a multiple testing issue and, fundamentally, the problem that what you’re sampling is very peripheral to the organ that matters. Where is the serotonin in the blood coming from? It’s mainly coming from platelets—it’s not coming from the brain. The bulk of serotonin in the body is in the gut. So you can measure… a ton of different proteins, different configurations, and modifications to those proteins probably have relatively little purchase on what is going on in the brain.

The simplest example is a protein called brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF), which is a really important neuroplasticity protein in the brain. It’s also found in the blood, and people tried over and over and over again. You see some positive studies, but mainly studies that are negative and some that are just not published that come to the conclusion that there’s very little bearing of what you’re measuring peripherally to what’s going on centrally.

Measuring the brain directly with EEG or the output of specific brain circuits through behavioral tests is much more amenable and has better performance statistics and interpretability for gaining insights. 

 

IPM: Has a specific layer or test modality enabled precision psychiatry programs for Alto Neuroscience, or are they ultimately based on aggregate measures?

Etkin: Less so in aggregate as measured together but each alone. We try not to combine everything into one model because it becomes very complicated, and we have already been told by the FDA in no uncertain terms that a multimodal biomarker is not something we will readily consider. To get a multimodal biomarker approved for some sort of use, you have to validate each and every component alone and their combination, which sounds like a headache. But I’m not sure you necessarily need to either. 

What I would consider to be a win is getting a drug for the whole population with a marker that enriches finding ways to show additional value in a drug program through a biomarker perspective and, over time, an iteration. The field then transforms into one where oncology already exists, which means they expect you to know what you’re doing. You have to understand the population. You have to understand how your drug impacts the biology that defines the population. We’re not there yet.

But they weren’t there yet either, in the same kind of single stroke that we now envision. It was like the first precision therapeutics, like Herceptin, were approved well over a decade before the immuno-oncology (IO) revolution. That really brought precision oncology into maturity, as we understand it now. That history suggests we probably need our IO moment as an inflection point, but we are not yet ready for it.

We need that Herceptin moment first: start transitioning how people think and collect data and create a bit more of a common language across programs so that different drug makers and different academic labs aren’t collecting their own unique data sets that aren’t then harmonized across them. You can’t speak about a thing as an invariant measure of a process that doesn’t matter who is measuring; they get the same outcome. 

The field has been somewhat resistant, probably for cultural reasons related to how people have historically operated, to a lot of data sharing and harmonizing of what we’re collecting, how we’re collecting it, and how we’re analyzing it. We’re just starting to really move in that direction. Those are all limits that gate the early-stage biomarker collection efforts.

 

IPM: Is there a future where someone walks in with a psychiatric condition and undergoes a battery of measurements that spits out a drug that has a high probability of being effective?

Etkin: I think that bar is a lot lower than that. It doesn’t have to be very effective—it just has to be more effective than chance. because that’s where we are. If I told you that instead of a 30% chance of remission with a drug, I could increase it to 40% or 45%, would that be helpful? That’s meaningful. You convert that to a number needed to treat it. For a clinician, this represents a significant effect, although it does not achieve perfect precision. All you need is something better than nothing, which is what we have. Of course, once you have something that’s better than nothing, now you have a new benchmark, and things will continue to improve, which is great. But the field’s got to start somewhere.

I don’t think it is that far away. I think in our efforts and the efforts of others in the field who have followed suit and taken a precision approach, something will work. When that changes, all of a sudden you can’t envision going back; it’s only going forward. That’ll be super exciting. It’s not like a “by the time I retire” kind of thing. It’s within the next five or a maximum of ten years that we will be at that inflection point.

 

IPM: Does precision psychiatry apply to the rest of neurology?

Etkin: If you anchored on the way I framed brain circuit function earlier. And what’s measurable is that there is no line between psychiatry and neurology. You have neurologists who are called “functional neurologists” or something in that vein, where they think about what I would call the “psychiatric aspects of neurology.”

A big part of Parkinson’s is cognitive impairment in a substantial portion of people, leading to dementia. Nothing to do with the movement disorder, but everything to do with the biology affecting different circuits. The right mood, in fact, is one of the earliest areas of perturbation in Parkinson’s that will then predict the development of the motor symptoms. Some people have perfectly well-controlled motor problems but have cognitive problems and mood problems that are even more prominent and lead to more, especially on the cognitive side, of their ultimate disabilities. Cognitive impairments are even a contraindication for deep brain stimulation.

Because of these interactions, all of these boundaries are artificial. It’s just a core engineering question of, can I know what I am measuring and what I am manipulating? There’s no reason we need to draw that line in an artificial way. It’s just about whether I can leverage the tools and the drugs in a useful way together.

The post Amit Etkin: Precision Psychiatry’s Future Isn’t Genomics—It’s Brain Activity appeared first on Inside Precision Medicine.

<![CDATA[A psychiatric clinician reveals how peers can spark small daily joy, beat burnout, and build balanced wellness that lasts.]]>

Neurophysiological basis for visual distortions in amblyopia

Despite decades of research, the neural basis of visual distortions in amblyopia remains poorly understood. While numerous studies have reported abnormalities in both early visual cortex and extrastriate areas, these findings have rarely been integrated into a unified mechanistic framework. This review addresses that gap by proposing a dual-level model of cortical distortion in amblyopia: one level reflecting local feature encoding deficits in V1, and a second reflecting integration-level distortions in retinotopic extrastriate cortex. By synthesizing behavioral, neurophysiological, and imaging data from adult human studies as well as animal models, this review offers a coherent neurophysiological account of amblyopic visual distortions and outlines a framework for interpreting current findings and guiding future interventions.

Mouse model of Angelman syndrome exhibits reduced retinal activity during development

Angelman Syndrome (AS) is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by intellectual disability, seizures, and motor dysfunction caused by loss of function of the maternal UBE3A allele. A large proportion of patients exhibit visual impairments, but the underlying circuit-level mechanisms are not well understood. Spontaneous retinal waves provide essential patterned activity that guides the wiring and refinement of retinofugal projections to visual brain centers during a critical early developmental window. Here, using high-density microelectrode array recordings from postnatal day 8–11 mouse retinas, we demonstrate that Ube3a deficiency leads to reduced retinal ganglion cell (RGC) firing rates and fewer retinal waves while largely preserving retinal wave propagation properties. The reduced activity levels observed in AS retinas represent a novel finding that may help explain how Ube3a deficiency disrupts the normal activity-dependent refinement of developing neural circuits.

Biomarker value of plasma endothelial microvesicle-derived circRNA 0006222 in vascular ageing and carotid atherosclerosis

BackgroundEndothelial microvesicles (EMVs) carrying circular RNAs (circRNAs) have emerged as promising novel biomarkers of ageing-associated disorders. This study investigated the potential of plasma EMVs-circ_0006222 as vascular ageing (VA) and carotid atherosclerosis (CAS) biomarkers.MethodsA circRNA microarray was applied to screen for differentially expressed circRNAs in plasma EMVs obtained from CAS participants, VA participants and healthy controls. VA was assessed according to intima thickness, and CAS was evaluated by using computed tomography angiography. The plasma EMVs-circ_0006222 level was determined via qRT-PCR. EMVs-circ_0006222 levels in patients of different ages and with different severities of CAS were compared. The diagnostic potential of EMVs-circ_0006222 was evaluated by using multivariable logistic regression and receiver-operator characteristic (ROC) curve analyses.ResultsA total of 47 healthy controls, 81 VA participants and 216 CAS participants were included in this study. Plasma EMVs-circ_0006222 levels were observed to be negatively associated with age. The plasma level of EMVs-circ_0006222 was markedly reduced in elderly participants, as well as VA and CAS participants; moreover, the decrease was most evident in the CAS group. The plasma EMVs-circ_0006222 level was declined in the severe CAS compared with the mild and moderate CAS subjects. Plasma EMVs-circ_0006222 level was identified by multivariate logistic regression as a significant, independent risk factor for VA and CAS. The areas under the ROC curve of plasma EMVs-circ_0006222 for diagnosing VA and CAS were 0.628 and 0.773, respectively.ConclusionPlasma EMVs-circ_0006222 may serve as a promising biomarker for VA and CAS.

Verbal fluency after cochlear implantation: a longitudinal comparison with untreated hearing loss in the ELSA cohort

IntroductionHearing loss is associated with accelerated cognitive decline, and auditory rehabilitation via cochlear implantation (CI) may mitigate this trajectory. In the past, the impact of cochlear implantation on different cognitive subdomains has been described. However, verbal fluency (VF), which requires fast semantic retrieval, executive control, and processing speed, and is predictive of dementia risk and overall survival, has been rarely studied and control groups are mostly missing due to ethical reasons. The present study compares long-term VF trajectories in CI recipients and untreated hearing-impaired controls from a large population-based aging study.Materials and methodsVF was assessed in 74 CI recipients (M = 65.6 years, SD = 9.1) at pre-operative baseline and 1, 2, 4.5, and up to 9 years post-implantation, and in 383 untreated hearing-impaired participants (M = 72.6 years, SD = 10.0) from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) across a comparable time frame. Scores were z-standardized within each study to enable cross-cohort comparison. Linear mixed-effects models were used to compare VF trajectories, with age, sex, and education as covariates.ResultsVF trajectories differed significantly between groups (Time × Study interaction: b = 0.562, p < 0.001). The ELSA cohort showed a steady linear decline over time (b = −0.261, p = 0.001), whereas the CI cohort exhibited an inverted-U trajectory with initial improvement followed by a plateau. After propensity score matching, results remained robust.ConclusionCochlear implantation is associated with more favorable long-term verbal fluency trajectories compared to untreated hearing loss. These findings add to the growing evidence that auditory rehabilitation may help preserve cognitive function in older adults.

Traumatic brain injury and neurological stealth syndromes

IntroductionA traumatic brain injury (TBI) of mild or more severe degree affects approximately ½ of the global population at some stage of their life. Mild TBI occurs in 70–90%, with 30 and 50% having symptoms persisting for more than 6 months. Mild TBI presentations include cognitive, elementary neurological, neuropsychiatric, endocrine, autonomic, cardiac, and general medical entities, with many behavioral neurological syndromes flying under the radar.AimsA retrospective examination of the cognitive and behavioral impairments in people with traumatic brain injury to evaluate the range of differing syndrome presentations, including hypofunction, hyperfunction and superla+ve brain function syndromes.MethodologyThe Brainbeat Cognitive Registry was a prospectively designed observational registry that collected clinical, cognitive, behavioral, neurological, neuropsychiatric, laboratory, and radiographic data from people with cognitive and behavioral disorders.ResultsIn the registry (n = 73), of predominantly men (88%), with averages for age 55.1 years, BMI 28.9, education 15.1 years, and MOCA score 21.7. Migraine, olfactory impairment, depression, anxiety, and PTSD were all relatively commonly associated conditions. Relatively common disorders with more complex syndromes, including Diogenes syndrome, IEED, ADHD, field-dependent behavior, and hyperorality, the later on presenting as a human Klüver Bucy syndrome. Less common disorders included other higher cortical function disorders (17.1%), neuropsychiatric (10.5%), cortico-ponto- cerebellar pathway syndromes (10.5%), and visual radiation disorders (6.5%). The least common were chronotaraxis, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, content-specific delusions, tremor, ataxia, astereopsis, and prosopagnosia. The majority of TBI patients presented with an overarching frontotemporal disorder (FTD) diagnosis (n = 68, 89.4%), with abnormal FRSBE scores for one or more entities of abulia, disinhibition, and executive dysfunction. Frontal Behavioral Inventory scores were abnormal in 86%. The most common neurological sub-syndrome was Geschwind-Gastaut syndrome (n = 49, 62.8%). A category of patients demonstrating superlative abilities (n = 9), including visual art, musical, literary, architectural brilliance, and precognition, all attributed to right hemisphere hyperfunction, was also identified.ConclusionPost-TBI frontotemporal disorders are common. Deconstructing the overarching FTD diagnosis into multiple subsyndromes is clinically useful, revealing hypofunction syndromes, hyperfunction, and superlative function syndromes. The range of neurological stealth syndromes as part of the post-TBI range of maladies may facilitate a more targeted, precision management approach.

Gone fishin’… for distinct patterns of belief-updating in late-life worry and rumination

IntroductionWorry and rumination are two common forms of repetitive negative thinking encountered as core symptoms of anxiety and depression. They are difficult to treat and increase the risk of relapse for remitted depressive and anxiety disorders, especially in late-life. We propose that dysfunctional belief-updating is a fundamental cognitive mechanism underlying repetitive negative thinking and use a Bayesian model to test whether distinct components of belief updating are differentially associated with worry and rumination.MethodsWe recruited 83 older participants (age≥50) dimensionally for worry and rumination to perform a belief-updating task and undergo neuropsychological testing. We extracted three parameters from a Bayesian model of belief-updating: performance compared to the Bayesian optimal model, emphasis on initial information (prior weight), and relative weighting of new evidence compared to current beliefs (update strength). These parameters were tested for associations with worry and rumination severity, and four neuropsychological domains were tested as moderators (attention, visuospatial, working memory maintenance, and executive function).ResultsWorry severity was uniquely associated with lower prior weight, while rumination was associated with low update strength. Neither worry nor rumination were associated with performance. None of the neuropsychological domains moderated these relationships.ConclusionWorry and rumination are associated with unique alterations in belief-updating but not overall performance. Low prior weight in worry may inflate perceived uncertainty, while low update strength in rumination—specifically reflective pondering—is consistent with slower incorporation of new information. Both biases may contribute to the distinct phenomenological profiles of worry and rumination and inform specific therapeutic targets for these symptoms.