Radically different
WASHINGTON — Vice President JD Vance on Wednesday announced new steps in the Trump administration’s initiative to root out fraud in federal health programs, including a $1.3 billion deferral in Medicaid reimbursements to California.
“These fraudulent health care providers are getting rich by giving people medications they don’t even need,” Vance said during an event at the White House, adding that taxpayers and program beneficiaries are victimized by such fraud.
Arriving in the isolation ward of a biocontainment hospital is an unsettling, scary experience. In 2014, I spent 19 days in one while being treated for Ebola, watching the news cycle churn around me as my world receded to a small window, a phone, and the handful of providers in protective suits who came into my room every day.
More than a dozen Americans are living some version of that right now in a Nebraska quarantine facility — passengers from the MV Hondius, the cruise ship that is at the center of a small but instructive outbreak of Andes hantavirus.
What you’re describing sounds really overwhelming. I’m glad you reached out. The fears you mention — being scared of doing something against your will, worrying you might not have control, and feeling intensely concerned about being judged — are patterns I often see in people with anxiety and, sometimes, people with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). A hallmark of OCD is a deep doubt about control: the fear that you might act in a way that goes against your values, even though you don’t want to. These kinds of fears are called intrusive thoughts. While intrusive thoughts can feel very real and frightening, they are not things you actually intend to do or predictions of things that you will do — they’re unwanted experiences that don’t define you.
Avoiding sports and other things for fear of being judged is also a symptom of anxiety. I can understand how hard it is to tell your family what you’re going through, especially if you have felt ignored in the past. At the same time, your pain deserves to be heard and taken seriously. I encourage you to try talking to your parents again, but if you truly feel like you can’t, consider telling one safe person — whether that’s another family member, a school counselor, or even a teacher you trust. You can write how you’re feeling in a note if speaking feels too hard.
The physical symptoms you mentioned — neck and shoulder pain, fidgeting — are also common in anxiety because our bodies can hold tension when our brains are on high alert. What this likely means is that your brain is caught in a fear loop, constantly scanning for danger around control and judgment.
The good news is that this is very treatable. A mental health professional may recommend a type of cognitive behavioral therapy called exposure and response prevention (ERP). ERP helps you gradually face the situations or thoughts you fear instead of looking for reassurance from someone else or avoiding those situations or thoughts altogether. Over time, ERP teaches your brain that thoughts are just thoughts, not actions, and that you can tolerate uncertainty without something bad happening.
For now, you might try gently labeling upsetting thoughts as anxiety, not facts, and practicing not accepting them as true when they show up. Taking small steps toward what you’ve been avoiding can help you rebuild your confidence, even if it feels uncomfortable at first.
While you can practice managing anxiety or intrusive thoughts on your own, it’s better to have help. Once you talk to someone you know and trust, have them help you reach out to a mental health professional who can provide a more thorough assessment and the appropriate treatment for you. You don’t have to go through this alone, and with the right support, this can get much better.
The post I’m scared of everything — what does it mean and how do I get over it? appeared first on Child Mind Institute.
I started creating health content online in medical school. I realized I could reach thousands of people in seconds and share medically accurate information with students around the world. For example, I made a video showing how deep an injection goes for vaccination. The public is both fascinated and afraid of injections, but dispelling the rumors that a massive needle could go as deep as your bone goes a long way in vaccine adoption.
During my emergency medicine residency, though, things changed. What had been seen during my interview process as a strength and skill set became “high risk” overnight. I was told that continuing to post on social media could jeopardize my career.
People report that their personal contact info was surfaced by Google AI—and there’s apparently no easy way to prevent it.
A Redditor recently wrote that he was “desperate for help”: for about a month, he said, his phone had been inundated by calls from “strangers” who were “looking for a lawyer, a product designer, a locksmith.” Callers were apparently misdirected by Google’s generative AI.
In March, a software developer in Israel was contacted on WhatsApp after Google’s chatbot Gemini provided incorrect customer service instructions that included his number.
And in April, a PhD candidate at the University of Washington was messing around on Gemini and got it to cough up her colleague’s personal cell phone number.
AI researchers and online privacy experts have long warned of the myriad dangers generative AI poses for personal privacy. These cases give us yet another scenario to worry about: generative AI exposing people’s real phone numbers. (The Redditor did not respond to multiple requests for comment and we could not independently verify his story.)
Experts say that these privacy lapses are most likely due to personally identifiable information (PII) being used in training data, though it’s hard to understand the exact mechanism causing real phone numbers to show up in the AI-generated responses. But no matter the reason, the result is not fun for people on the receiving end—and, even more worryingly, there appears to be little that anyone can do to stop it.
It’s impossible to know how often people’s phone numbers are exposed by AI chatbots, but experts say they believe that it is happening far more than is reported publicly.
DeleteMe, a company that helps customers remove their personal information from the internet, says customer queries about generative AI have increased by 400%—up to a few thousand—in the last seven months. These queries “specifically reference ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini … or other generative AI tools,” says Rob Shavell, the company’s cofounder and CEO. Specifically, 55% of these concerns about generative AI reference ChatGPT, 20% reference Gemini, 15% Claude, and 10% other AI tools, Shavell says. (MIT Technology Review has a business subscription to DeleteMe.)
Shavell says customer complaints about personal information being surfaced by LLMs usually take two forms: Either “a customer asks a chatbot something innocuous about themselves and gets back accurate home addresses, phone numbers, family members’ names, or employer details.” Alternatively, a customer may be confronted with and report the exposure of someone else’s personal data, when “the chatbot generates plausible-but-wrong contact information.”
This aligns with what happened to Daniel Abraham, a 28-year-old software engineer in Israel. In mid-March, he says, a stranger sent him a “weird WhatsApp message from an unknown number” asking for help with his account in PayBox, an Israeli payment app.
“I thought it was a spam message,” he wrote to MIT Technology Review in an email—“someone who was trying to troll me.”
But when he asked the stranger how they had found his number, they sent him a screenshot of Gemini’s instructions to contact PayBox customer service via WhatsApp—giving his personal number. Abraham does not work for PayBox, and PayBox does not have a WhatsApp customer service number, Elad Gabay, a customer service representative for the company, confirmed.
Later, Abraham asked Gemini how to contact PayBox, and it generated another person’s WhatsApp number. When I recently asked, Gemini again responded with an Israeli phone number—it belonged not to PayBox, but to a separate credit card company that works with PayBox.
Abraham’s exchange with the stranger ended quickly, but he said he was concerned about how other potential exchanges could quickly turn sour, including “harassment or other bad interactions.” “What if I asked for money in order to ‘solve’ that [customer service] issue?” he said.
To try to figure out how this happened, Abraham ran a regular Google search on his phone number, and he found that it had been shared online once, back in 2015, on a local site similar to Quora. Though he’s not sure who posted it there, it may explain how it ended up being reproduced by Gemini over a decade later.
Chatbots like Gemini, Open AI’s ChatGPT, and Anthropic’s Claude are built on LLMs that are trained on huge amounts of data scraped from across the web. This inevitably includes hundreds of millions of instances of PII. As we reported last summer, for example, the large popular open-source data set DataComp CommonPool, which has been used to train image-generation models, included copies of résumés, driver’s licenses, and credit cards.
The likelihood of PII appearing in AI training data is only increasing as public data “runs out” and AI companies look for new sources of high-quality training data. This includes information from data brokers and people-search websites. According to the California data broker registry, for instance, 31 of 578 registered data brokers operating in the state self-reported that they had “shared or sold consumers’ data to a developer of a GenAI system or model in the past year.”
Furthermore, models are known to memorize and reproduce data verbatim from training data sets—and recent research suggests that it is not just frequently appearing data that is most likely to be memorized.
It’s standard practice now to build guardrails into an LLM’s design to constrain certain outputs, ranging from content filters meant to identify and prevent chatbots from releasing PII to Anthropic’s instructions to Claude to choose responses that contain “the least personal, private, or confidential information belonging to others.”
But as a pair of University of Washington PhD students researching privacy and technology saw firsthand recently, these safeguards don’t always work.
“One day, I was just playing around on Gemini, and I searched for Yael Eiger, my friend and collaborator,” Meira Gilbert says. She typed in “Yael Eiger contact info,” and after Gemini provided an overview of Eiger’s research, which Gilbert had expected, Gemini also returned her friend’s personal phone number. “It was shocking,” Gilbert says.
When she saw the Gemini result, Eiger remembered that she had, in fact, shared her phone number online in the previous year, for a technology workshop. But she had not expected it to be so visible to everyone on the internet.
Have you had your PII revealed by generative AI? Reach the reporter on Signal at eileenguo.15 or tips@technologyreview.com.
“Having your information be … accessible to one audience, and then Gemini making it accessible to anyone” feels completely different, Eiger says—especially when she found that the information was buried in a normal Google search.
“It was severely downgraded,” Gilbert confirms. “I never would have found it if I was just looking through Google results.” (I tried the same prompt in Gemini earlier this month, and after an initial denial, the tool also gave me Eiger’s number.)
After this experience, Eiger, Gilbert, and another UW PhD student, Anna-Maria Gueorguieva, decided to test ChatGPT to see what it would surface about a professor.
At first, OpenAI’s guardrails kicked in, and ChatGPT responded that the information was unavailable. But in the same response, the chatbot suggested, “if you want to go deeper, I can still try a more ‘investigative-style’ approach.” Their inquiry just had to help “narrow things down,” ChatGPT said, by providing “a neighborhood guess” for where the professor might live, or “a possible co-owner name” for the professor’s home. ChatGPT continued: “That’s usually the only way to surface newer or intentionally less-visible property records.”
The students provided this information, leading ChatGPT to produce the professor’s home address, home purchase price, and spouse’s name from city property records.
(Taya Christianson, an OpenAI representative, said she was not able to comment on what happened in this case without seeing screenshots or knowing which model the students had tested, though we pointed out that many users may not know which model they were using in the ChatGPT interface. In response to questions about the exposure of PII, she sent links to documents describing how OpenAI handles privacy, including filtering out PII, and other tools.)
This reveals one of the fundamental problems with chatbots, says DeleteMe’s Shavell. AI companies “can build in guardrails, but [their chatbots] are also designed to be effective and to answer customer questions.”
The exposure issue is not limited to Gemini or ChatGPT. Last year, Futurism found that if you prompted xAI’s chatbot Grok with “[name] address,” in almost all cases, it provided not only residential addresses but also often the person’s phone numbers, work addresses, and addresses for people with similar-sounding names. (xAI did not respond to a request for comment.)
There aren’t straightforward solutions to this problem—there’s no easy way to either verify whether someone’s personal information is in a given model’s training set or to compel the models to remove PII.
Ideally, individual consumers should be able to request that their PII be removed, says Jennifer King, the privacy and data fellow at Stanford University Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence. But this is typically interpreted to apply only to the data that people have directly given to companies—like when they interact with a chatbot, King explains.
“I don’t know if Google even has the infrastructure … to say to me, ‘Yes, we have your data in our training data, we can summarize what we know about you, and then we can delete or correct things that are wrong or things that you don’t want in there,’” she says.
Existing privacy legislation, like the California Consumer Privacy Act or Europe’s GDPR, does not cover the “publicly available” information that has already been scraped and used to train LLMs, especially since much of this is anonymized (though multiple studies have also shown how easy it is to infer identities and PII from anonymized and pseudonymous data).
As to “whether they [AI companies] have ever systematically tried to go back through data that had already been collected from the public internet and minimized that stuff?” King adds. “No idea.”
The next best solution would be that the companies are “taking out everybody’s phone numbers or all data that resembles [phone numbers],” King says, but “nobody’s been willing to say” they’re doing that.
Hugging Face, a platform that hosts open-source data sets and AI models, has a tool that allows people to search how often a piece of data—like their phone number—has appeared in open-source LLM training data sets, but this does not necessarily represent what has been used to train closed LLMs that power popular chatbots like Claude, ChatGPT, and Gemini. (Eiger’s number, for example, did not show up in Hugging Face’s tool.)
Alex Joseph, the head of communications for Gemini apps and Google Labs, did not respond to specific questions, but he said that “the team” is “looking into” the particular cases flagged by MIT Technology Review. He also provided a link to a support document that describes how users can “object to the processing of your personal data” or “ask for inaccurate personal data in Gemini Apps’ responses to be corrected.” The page notes that the company’s response will depend on the privacy laws of your jurisdiction.
OpenAI has a privacy portal that allows people to submit requests to remove their personal information from ChatGPT responses, but notes that it balances privacy requests with the public interest and “may decline a request if we have a lawful reason for doing so.”
Anthropic describes how it uses personal data in model training, but it does not have a clear way for people to request its removal. The company did not respond to a request for comment.
The best option for anyone who wants to protect their private data right now is to “start upstream: get personal data off the public web before it ends up in the next scrape,” says Shavell. Since the start of the year, for instance, California has offered its residents a web portal to request that data brokers delete their information. Still, this doesn’t guarantee that your data hasn’t already been used for training—and will therefore not appear in a chatbot’s response.
The Redditor who received incessant calls posted that he had “submitted an official Legal Removal/Privacy Request to Google, asking them to urgently blacklist my number from their LLM outputs,” but had not yet received a response. He also wrote last month that “the harassment continues daily.”
Abraham, the Israeli software developer, says he contacted Google’s customer service on March 17, the day after his phone number was exposed. He says he did not receive a response until May 4, and it simply asked for documentation that he had already provided.
Meanwhile, inspired by her own exposure on Gemini, Eiger, along with Gilbert and Gueorguieva, is designing a research project to further study what personal information is being surfaced by various AI chatbots—and what they may know, even if they’re not telling us.
Some of that information may “technically be public,” says Gilbert, but chatbots may be altering “the amount of effort you would put into finding” it. Now instead of searching through 10 pages of Google search results, or paying for the information from a data broker site, “does generative AI just lower the barrier to entry to target people?”
This piece has been updated to clarify OpenAI’s response.
WASHINGTON — The Trump administration is moving quickly to identify the next commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration after the resignation of Marty Makary on Tuesday, with an eye for someone who can rebuild trust with agency staff, focus on the agency’s food policy, and continue to drive drug-approval reforms.
Administration leaders hope to conduct the search over “the next several weeks,” according to an official with knowledge of the process, granted anonymity to speak candidly. Despite chatter among lobbyists about who is in contention, there’s currently no short list of candidates, the official said.
Despite the urgency, the process will take a while. The Senate is in session for only so many days, and the administration also needs to confirm Erica Schwartz, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention nominee, and Nicole Saphier, the surgeon general nominee. It’s possible Kyle Diamantas, formerly in charge of the FDA’s food center, will still be acting commissioner when the midterms arrive in November.
Background: Older adults facing social or structural marginalization for reasons such as lower literacy, digital exclusion, financial constraints, restricted living environments, or complex health histories, face persistent barriers to much-needed health screening. Digital health tools, particularly those using audio computer-assisted self-interview (ACASI) technology, offer potential to overcome these barriers (audio-delivered and self-administrable), but their application to marginalized populations remains underexplored. Moreover, guidance is limited for developing such tools which require collaboration within cross-disciplinary teams. This paper presents development insights and user testing findings from the ASCAPE (Audio App-Delivered Screening for Cognition and Age-Related Health in Prisoners) project, which aimed to develop equitable digital frailty and cognition screening for older people in Australian prisons. Objective: This study aims to describe the collaborative development of the “ASCAPE-HS” prototype, a tablet-based ACASI-delivered Frailty Index and aging screener, and to synthesize key lessons from the project that can inform equitable digital health tool development in hard-to-reach older adults. Also, to present findings on the usability and acceptability of ASCAPE-HS in a diverse community sample. Methods: The ASCAPE-HS prototype was developed through an iterative process involving researchers, clinicians, software developers, and end users under a digital health equity framework. The prototype included a self-administered, audio-delivered Frailty Index, alongside other items relevant to aging. The design process prioritized accessibility, sociocultural relevance, and technical feasibility, with regular multidisciplinary consultation and iterative refinement. Exploratory user testing with 20 older adults (aged 47‐93 years, including n=5 who had not finished secondary schooling, n=3 people with previous imprisonment history, and n=9 with mild or moderate cognitive impairment) provided feedback on usability and acceptability. Results: A 50-item Frailty Index was developed, alongside an additional selection of holistic questions that could meaningfully capture age-related health, and transferred to an iOS app (Apple, Inc), with ACASI features. Key elements included lay wording, consistent interface, simple “tapping” response options with repeatable audio feedback, a tutorial, and artificial intelligence–generated audio guidance. Key development considerations were synthesized into a checklist for teams undertaking similar projects. Successful strategies for the collaborative design process included diverse teams abreast of emerging literature and policy with varying expectations for engagement during development, and dedicating time to flexible, iterative development processes. Acceptability (median scores ≥4 out of 5 across 6 constructs) and usability (mean System Usability Scale score 79.0, SD 8.8) were high. Conclusions: A collaborative approach can produce ACASI-based health screening tools that are well-received by older adults. We highlight the feasibility of integrating frailty and aging assessment into a usable and acceptable digital tool, and offer actionable principles for collaborative, evidence-based development of equitable health screening tools in diverse, hard-to-reach populations.
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Background: Major depressive disorder (MDD) affects approximately 1 in 6 adults during their lifetime, yet antidepressant selection relies predominantly on trial-and-error, with response rates of only 42% to 53%. While machine learning (ML) models have shown promise in predicting treatment outcomes, most focus on single treatments rather than comparative selection across therapeutic alternatives, limiting their clinical utility for the medication choice decisions that clinicians face in practice. Objective: This systematic review evaluates ML approaches that examine 2 or more pharmacological interventions for predicting treatment outcomes in MDD, with a focus on their capacity to facilitate comparative treatment selection between medications or medication classes for individual patients. Methods: Following PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) guidelines, we searched PubMed, Scopus, and Web of Science for studies published from 2015 to 2025. We included studies involving adults with MDD that used ML models to predict treatment outcomes across 2 or more pharmacological treatments and reported medication-specific prediction outcomes. Risk of bias was assessed using PROBAST-AI (Prediction Model Risk of Bias Assessment Tool for Artificial Intelligence). We conducted a narrative synthesis organized by modeling strategies, data integration approaches, validation methodologies, and performance patterns. Results: From 5370 initial records, 19 studies met the inclusion criteria, with dataset sample sizes ranging from 49 to 77,226 participants. Studies employed 3 distinct modeling strategies: drug-specific supervised models trained independently for each medication, subtype- or trajectory-based approaches using clustering methods to identify differential response patterns, and a unified differential prediction framework generating calibrated cross-treatment predictions. Performance varied substantially, with area under the curve values ranging from 0.59 to 0.95 and classification accuracies between 62% and 95.4%, though high performance was concentrated in studies with small samples, high-dimensional neurobiological features, and internal-only validation. Only 7 studies conducted external validation, which generally yielded more conservative performance estimates. Feature informativeness was more consistently associated with performance variation than algorithm complexity. Most studies did not formally distinguish between prognostic features predicting general outcomes and predictive features identifying differential medication responses, and none applied formal explainability techniques. Conclusions: ML for comparative antidepressant selection remains in an early stage of development. Only 1 study implemented a unified framework directly supporting patient-level treatment ranking. Key barriers to clinical translation include insufficient distinction between prognostic and predictive markers, limited cross-trial validation, near-absent calibration reporting, and absent explainability. Future research should prioritize unified comparative frameworks with calibrated predictions, rigorous external validation on diverse cohorts, explicit modeling of heterogeneous treatment effects, and integration of explainability into model development.
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